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FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LAW,
HISTORY, POLICY, AND POLITICS
George Brooks*

INTRODUCTION
George W. Bush became the forty-third President of the United States
when he won the state of Florida by 537 votes in the 2000 election. 1
Because the election was so close, hotly-contested, and divisive, aspects of
our electoral system long relegated to dusty books suddenly became topics
of water cooler conversation and cocktail party chatter. Some Democrats
speculate that if the nearly 600,000 felons in Florida 2 had been allowed to
vote, Al Gore would have been elected President.3
Felon disenfranchisement 4 has thus become a cause celèbre among
liberals. 5 There are approximately four million felons who cannot vote
They are disproportionately black and Hispanic 7—
nationwide. 6

* Dedicated to the memory of Alan El Naboulsy. I miss you terribly. The author would like
to acknowledge the support and understanding of Professor Robert Kaczorowski.
1. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000).
2. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
3. Rebecca Perl, The Last Disenfranchised Class, THE NATION, Nov. 24, 2003, at 11,
14, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20031124/perl.
4. For the purposes of this note, the term “felon disenfranchisement” includes any
convicted felon currently incarcerated or ex-felon now on parole or probation who cannot
vote.
5. “Civil rights advocates predict that voting rights for prisoners and ex-prisoners will
be the next [U.S.] suffrage movement, as lawyers, prison advocates, voting rights groups
and foundations have recently begun to join forces and take up the cause.” Perl, supra note
3, at 11.
6. One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 1940 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote]; accord Brian Pinaire et al., Barred
from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1519, 1520 (2003). Some estimates for the number of disenfranchised felons run
as high as five million. See Perl, supra note 3, at 11.
7. Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement—A Race Neutral Punishment for
Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y
359, 364 (2002). This note focuses almost exclusively on felon disenfranchisement and
African-Americans because of their history of enslavement and discrimination.
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constituencies that have traditionally been Democratic strongholds.8
Embittered by the 2000 elections, Democrats have seized on the goal of
extending suffrage to felons in hopes of increasing their traditional voter
base, thus helping them win close elections. 9 They face an uphill battle,
however, as history, law, and policy weigh against allowing felons to vote.
Part I of this note places felon disenfranchisement in a historical context,
highlights significant cases and jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Voting Rights Act, and reviews the scope of its impact
today. Part II considers the divergent interpretations of law that have led to
uncertainty in the circuits as to whether the Voting Rights Act reaches
felon disenfranchisement and when felon disenfranchisement statutes
originally enacted with discriminatory intent have been cleansed of that
taint. The confusion in the circuits stems from conflicting views of what
the history of felon disenfranchisement means and whether there are
legitimate underlying policy rationales. Part III argues that the Voting
Rights Act does not reach felon disenfranchisement and thus the Fourteenth
Amendment is controlling, therefore these laws are only susceptible to
attack on constitutional grounds if they were enacted with discriminatory
intent. Thus, we are left with policy arguments, which are properly decided
in state legislatures.
I. BACKGROUND: HISTORY, JURISPRUDENCE AND IMPACT
A. Early Origins
Felon disenfranchisement has a long history, with origins in ancient
Greece. 10 In medieval Europe, it was expressed in the concept of “civil
death.” 11 In Britain, “outlawry” stripped a criminal of his right to
8. See Pinaire et al., supra note 6, at 1545-46.
9. See id. at 1545-47. As many as three-quarters of disenfranchised felons could be
expected to vote for Democrats. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF FELONY DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2001), at
http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/papers/2000/disfranchise.pdf (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005).
10. See Nathan P. Litwin, Note, Defending an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush
Upheld Felon Disenfranchisement and Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 236, 237 (2003). In ancient Greece, “‘[c]riminals pronounced infamous were
prohibited from appearing in court, voting, making speeches, attending assemblies, and
serving in the army.’” The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and
‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1989) [hereinafter The
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons] (quoting Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of
a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941 (1970)).
11. Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Consequence
of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 248, 248 (2000).
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protection of the laws for his life and property. 12
The first
disenfranchisement laws in America appeared in the 1600s, typically as
punishment for morality crimes such as drunkenness, 13 and were present
from the earliest times of the Republic.14
The power of the states to establish voter qualifications is found in
Article I, Section Two of the United States Constitution, which provides
that “the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.” 15 States have “broad powers to determine the
conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, absent of
course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns.” 16 The “wide
scope” of power held by the states to set qualifications includes
“[r]esidence requirements, age, [and] previous criminal record.” 17
From 1776 to 1821, eleven states adopted constitutions that
disenfranchised felons or permitted their statutory disenfranchisement.18
Virginia was the first in 1776, followed by Kentucky in 1799, Ohio, in
1802, Louisiana, in 1812, Indiana, in 1816, Mississippi, in 1817,
Connecticut and Illinois in 1818, Alabama, in 1819, Missouri, in 1820, and
New York in 1821. 19 Eighteen more states had followed suit by the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. 20
These early laws rested on John Locke’s concept that those who break
12. The theory behind outlawry was that
“[h]e who breaks the law has gone to war with the community; the community
goes to war with him. It is the right and duty of every man to pursue him, to
ravage his land, to burn his house, to hunt him down like a wild beast and slay
him; for a wild beast he is; not merely is he a ‘friendless man,’ he is a wolf.”
Carlos M. Portugal, Comment, Democracy Frozen in Devonian Amber: The Racial Impact
of Permanent Felon Disenfranchisement in Florida, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1317, 1318-19
(2003) (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 448 (photo. reprint 1923) (2d ed. 1898)).
13. Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal
and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236
(2004).
14. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 18, 2004), at
http://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
16. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
17. Id. at 51.
18. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
19. Id. at 450 n.4.
20. These states were Delaware (1831), Tennessee (1834), Florida (1838), Rhode Island
(1842), New Jersey (1844), Texas (1845), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California
(1849), Maryland (1851), Minnesota (1857), Oregon (1857), Kansas (1859), West Virginia
(1863), Nevada (1864), South Carolina (1865), Georgia (1868), and North Carolina (1868).
Id. at 450 n.5.
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the social contract should not be allowed to participate in the process of
making society’s rules. 21 Other justifications included the prevention of
election fraud, the fear that criminals would weaken laws and their
enforcement, and a “purity of the ballot box” concept that felons lack the
“moral competence” needed to vote. 22 The Alabama Supreme Court
vindicated felon disenfranchisement in Washington v. State 23 on the theory
that:
It is quite common also to deny the right of suffrage, in the various
American States, to such as have been convicted of infamous crimes. The
manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the
only sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection
against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against that of
ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. The evil infection of the one is not more
fatal than that of the other. The presumption is, that one rendered
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of great
moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to hold
office, upon terms of equality with freemen who are clothed by the State
with the toga of political citizenship. 24

B. Civil War and Reconstruction
The aftermath of the Civil War wrought enormous changes, in both
society and the law. The Thirteenth Amendment, which banned slavery
and involuntary servitude (except as punishment for a crime), was enacted
in 1865. 25 The Fourteenth Amendment was passed in 1868; Section One
contained the Equal Protection Clause and Section Two sanctioned the
disenfranchisement of those who participated in rebellion or were
The last of the Reconstruction
convicted of “other crime[s]”. 26

21. Id. at 451. Social contract theory states that “freely choosing” persons come
together to create a society and government system that “protect[s] and promote[s] their
basic rights and interests” by forming rules which each individual agrees to abide by. A
violation of the contract disturbs “the balance of rights and responsibilities,” leading to
punishment, including the loss of the right to participate in the rule-making process. Pinaire
et al., supra note 6, at 1525-26.
22. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1302-03.
23. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
24. Id. at 585.
25. The full text of the Thirteenth Amendment reads, “Section 1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
26. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part,
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
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Amendments was the Fifteenth, which was ratified in 1870 and extended
the franchise to blacks. 27
While all three amendments are important for civil rights, the Fourteenth
stands out as perhaps the most important constitutional amendment ever
passed. 28 Section One provides that,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 29

The Equal Protection Clause in Section One has been the basis on which
modern courts have been able to strike down laws and practices that
intentionally discriminate on the basis of race, as stated or as applied.30
Section Two diminishes state representation in Congress as a punishment
for states that infringe voting rights, unless those rights are abridged “for
participation in rebellion, or other crime.” 31

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such state.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. The full text of the Fifteenth Amendment reads,
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
28. Bernard Schwartz, The Amendment in Operation: A Historical Overview, in THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CENTENNIAL VOLUME, 29 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970). Accord
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 1-2 (1988).
29. See supra note 26.
30. See Schwartz, supra note 28, at 32; NELSON, supra note 28, at 2.
31. See supra note 26.
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Due to ambiguities in Section One, Section Two lends itself to dual
interpretation. First, it can be viewed as a “remedy,” 32 or perhaps more
accurately as a punishment, by reducing a state’s representation in
Congress when it violates a right protected in Section One.33 Alternatively,
it can be construed as an implicit authorization to deny black suffrage; the
“remedy” does not prevent a violation, it only provides a punishment for
the occurrence. 34 Politically, either construction would have been
acceptable to the Republicans of the Reconstruction era. Either blacks
would have been enfranchised and would presumably have voted for
Lincoln’s Republican party, 35 or they would not have been allowed to vote,
which would have reduced Southern—and predominately Democrat—
representation in Congress by invoking Section Two; thus increasing
Northern —and mostly Republican—representation in Congress.36
Union troops occupied the Confederacy during Reconstruction and
despite enfranchising nearly one million former slaves, 37 they continued to
enforce laws denying the vote to convicted felons. The Military
Reconstruction Act of 1867 specifically exempted convicted felons from
exercising the franchise. 38 Before former Confederate states were
readmitted to the Union, they were required to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment 39 and bring their state laws into “conformity with the
Constitution of the United States in all respects.” 40 Upon meeting these
requirements, Congress then passed enabling acts which formally

32. NELSON, supra note 28, at 57-58.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 50-51.
35. Id. at 47, 59 (noting an argument in favor of conferring the franchise on Southern
blacks that “[i]t was expected that blacks would vote in favor of those who had given them
their freedom and that . . . their votes would bring about the election of loyal candidates to
Congress and the state legislatures,” and emphasizing that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
must be understood as the Republican party’s plan for securing the fruits both of the war and
of the three decades of antislavery agitation preceding it”).
36. See id. at 50-51, 57-58.
37. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote:
Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J.
259, 271 (2004).
38. See id. at 270.
The Reconstruction Act enfranchised male citizens of [any former Confederate]
State, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color or previous
condition, who have been resident in said State for one year previous to the day of
such election, except as may be disenfranchised for participation in the rebellion
or for felony at common law.
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429.
39. Chin, supra note 37, at 270.
40. § 5, 14 Stat. at 429, quoted in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 49 (1974).
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readmitted a state to the Union. 41 These acts placed “fundamental
condition[s]” on states regarding suffrage. 42 Arkansas provides a typical
example, being the first former Confederate state to be readmitted to the
Union, in June 1868. 43 The Act of June 22, 1868 provided in relevant part:
That the State of Arkansas is entitled and admitted to representation in
Congress as one of the States of the Union upon the following
fundamental condition: That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be
so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the
United States of the right to vote who are entitled to vote by the
constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as
are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly
convicted, under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said
State. . . . 44

Despite the lofty goals of the Reconstruction era, Jim Crow came to
dominate the South as Reconstruction ended, and blacks were socially and
politically excluded from full participation in the life of the nation. 45 Their
right to vote was systematically denied through use of poll taxes,46
grandfather clauses, 47 and property tests, 48 as well as literacy tests49 and
intimidation. 50
The Supreme Court participated in this process by dismantling what
Congress had accomplished in the Reconstruction Amendments. 51 The
Court construed the Amendments very narrowly in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 52 concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended only to
combat discrimination against former slaves and gutting the privileges and

41. Chin, supra note 37, at 270.
42. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52.
43. Id. at 51.
44. Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (emphasis added), quoted in Richardson,
418 U.S. at 51. Variations of this “fundamental condition” were also imposed on North
Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Mississippi, and
Texas. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52.
45. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND
POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901 at ix-x (2001).
46. CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 389-90 (1940).
47. Grandfather clauses were considered advantageous because unlike literacy tests and
polls taxes, they disenfranchised blacks but not illiterate whites. Id. at 391-92.
48. Pinaire et al., supra note 6, at 1525.
49. MANGUM, supra, note 46, at 390-91.
50. Id. at 394.
51. HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 77-89 (1973); see also
LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO 180-81 (1966).
52. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 53 In 1883, the Civil
Rights Cases 54 held that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to state
action, thus declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional. 55 The
Court also restricted Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment
by ruling that the refusal to serve a black person in a public accommodation
was not a “badge of slavery” and thus was beyond Congress’s reach.56
Justice Harlan’s dissenting argument that Congress could reach public
accommodations under the Fourteenth Amendment would have to wait
until the so-called Second Reconstruction began in the 1950s. 57 Finally, in
Plessy v. Ferguson 58 in 1896, the Court validated the concept of “separate
but equal” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 59
Felon disenfranchisement was sometimes used as a tool by the states to
Some Southern states passed laws
disenfranchise blacks. 60
disenfranchising those convicted of what were considered to be “black”
crimes, while those convicted of “white” crimes did not lose their right to
vote. 61 For example, South Carolina disenfranchised criminals convicted
of “thievery, adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreaking, and attempted
rape,” but not those convicted of murder or fighting.62 Mississippi
modified its broad, earlier law—which disenfranchised convicts of “any
crime”—to specifically target “black” crimes.63
Although five Southern states passed felon disenfranchisement laws
targeting blacks from 1890 to 1910, more than eighty percent of states

53. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 104-07.
54. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
55. See MILLER, supra note 51, at 138-39.
56. CLAUDINE L. FERRELL, RECONSTRUCTION 58 (2003).
57. Id.
58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
59. MORROE BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE: THE REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS 76-77
(rev. ed. 1967).
60. Mauer, supra note 11, at 3.
61. Theft was often considered a “black” crime and led to felony disenfranchisement,
while murder was viewed as a “white” crime and did not lead to disenfranchisement. See
Litwin, supra note 10, at 238.
62. Id. See also Chin, supra note 37, at 305 (quoting Ratliffe v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868
(Miss. 1896), where the Mississippi Supreme Court described blacks as “a patient, docile
people, but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and
its criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the
whites.” It therefore held that the state constitutional convention “discriminated against . . .
the offenses to which its weaker members were prone . . . . Burglary, theft, arson, and
obtaining money under false pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while robbery
and murder and other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were not.”).
63. Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 540 (1993).
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nationwide already had felon disenfranchisement laws by that time. 64
“[O]utside the [S]outh, disenfranchisement laws ‘lacked socially distinct
targets and generally were passed in a matter-of-fact fashion.’” 65 The
Supreme Court twice upheld felon disenfranchisement as a punishment for
polygamy in the late nineteenth century, noting it “is not open to any
constitutional or legal objection.”66
C. Modern Era
The full realization of equal rights, including voting rights for black
Americans, would have to wait for nearly a century. 67 As the Civil Rights
movement progressed, various obstacles that had prevented blacks from
voting were eliminated. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964,
eliminated poll taxes. 68 New life was breathed into the Reconstruction
Amendments—the Fourteenth Amendment became a “potent tool” in
achieving justice for minorities.69
To correct the past failure of the Reconstruction Amendments to
enfranchise African-Americans in practice, particularly in the South,
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which outlawed
discriminatory voting devices such as literacy tests. 70 Section Two of the
Act prohibited any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.” 71 Congress used its enforcement powers under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment 72 and Section Two of the Fifteenth
Amendment 73 to enact the Voting Rights Act. 74 The Act was tremendously

64. Clegg, supra note 14. The five states are Mississippi (1890), South Carolina (1895),
Louisiana (1898), Alabama (1901), and Virginia (1901-02). Shapiro, supra note 63, at 54041.
65. Clegg, supra note 14.
66. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890); see also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15 (1885).
67. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
69. William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 10 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970).
70. Martine J. Price, Note, Addressing Ex-felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs.
Litigation, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 384 (2002).
71. Section Two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 reads in full, “No voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1965) (amended 1975).
72. See supra note 26 for the full text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
73. See supra note 27.
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successful in extending suffrage to black Americans. 75
Despite facing judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Voting Rights Act in the 1960s and 70s, felon disenfranchisement laws
were almost always found to be constitutional.76 Stephens v. Yeomans was
the one exception, which found New Jersey’s felon disenfranchisement law
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 77 In Yeomans, the
court could “perceive no rational basis for the . . . classification” of felons
as a group that could not vote. 78 In the subsequent case of Fincher v.
Scott, 79 however, a district court in North Carolina openly mocked the
Yeomans court’s holding and reasoning. 80 The Supreme Court itself
seemed to acknowledge the validity of felon disenfranchisement but did not
rule on the issue directly. 81

74. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1998).
75. From 1965 to 1968, the percentage of blacks who were registered to vote increased
from 6.7 percent to 59.8 percent in Mississippi, from 19.3 percent to 51.6 percent in
Alabama, from 27.4 percent to 52.6 percent in Georgia, and from 31.6 percent to 58.9
percent in Louisiana. FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH 308 (1978).
76. See Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 1996) (citing Fincher v. Scott,
352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Kronlund v. Honstein 327
F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969),
aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969)). Challenges have also been made under other theories, but none
have been very successful. See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984 (4th
Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (affirming dismissal of a felon disenfranchisement claim under the First
Amendment because there is no private right of action therein for canceled voting rights and
dismissing under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment because plaintiff’s restoration of his civil
rights was conditioned on paying a fee, not his right to vote); Kronlund, 327 F. Supp. 71
(holding that felon disenfranchisement does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it is
a non-penal exercise of the state’s power to set voter qualifications and thus is not cruel and
unusual punishment).
77. 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970).
78. Id. at 1188.
79. 352 F. Supp. 117.
80. Id. at 118.
Holmes must have had in mind this sort of case when he penned his aphorism that
the life of the law is not logic but experience. For an excellent example, indeed,
the only example, of the equal protection logic of plaintiff’s position, see Stephens
v. Yeomans. We admire the technique and would be persuaded by it but for what
seems to us the compelling argument of history.
Id. (citations omitted).
81. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (“Minors, felons, and other classes
may be excluded [from choosing senators].”); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97
(1958) (holding that one “who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses his right to
liberty and often his right to vote . . . . [T]he purpose of the latter statute is to designate a
reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the
power to regulate the franchise.”).
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D. Judicial Challenges Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The tension between Sections One and Two 82 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was settled when the Supreme Court decided Richardson v.
Ramirez 83 in 1974. 84 Three convicted felons who had served their
sentences and completed probation brought a class action suit when they
were not allowed to register to vote. 85 The California Supreme Court held
that disenfranchisement of felons who had served their time and completed
parole—under provisions of the state constitution of 1879 86—was a
violation of equal protection under Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment because California could not assert a compelling state interest
to justify the practice. 87
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, citing the plain language of Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its historical and judicial
interpretation. 88 The Court held that the framers of the Amendment
intended to exclude felons from the franchise. 89 After an initial draft was
rejected by the Senate, the language, “except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime,” was not changed despite several debates and proposed
revisions. 90 More specifically, although it granted that the legislative
history bearing on the words “or other crime” was scant, the Court found it
consistent with the clear wording of the section. 91 Senator Henderson of
Missouri felt that Section Two was an improvement on the earlier draft
because disenfranchisement would follow for black and white alike.92
Likewise, Senator Drake of Missouri had introduced the modifying phrase
“under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State” to the
Act readmitting Arkansas 93 so that felon disenfranchisement laws would
not be used to disenfranchise blacks.94
Despite contemporaneous decisions by the Court striking down state

82. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
83. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
84. “The decision in Richardson is generally recognized as having closed the door on
the equal protection argument.” Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir. 1981).
85. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26-27.
86. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. II, § 1; art. XX, § 11.
87. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 27, 54.
88. Id. at 54.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 43-45.
91. Id. at 43.
92. Id. at 47-48.
93. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
94. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 52.
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voter
qualifications
on
equal
protection
grounds, 95
felon
disenfranchisement was distinguishable because it receives an “affirmative
sanction” in Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment. 96 Richardson
held the framers’ intent to be of “controlling significance” in distinguishing
felon disenfranchisement from other state laws restricting the franchise that
the Court had struck down as violating the Equal Protection Clause.97
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment could not have been meant to
bar a form of disenfranchisement expressly permitted in Section Two. 98
In his dissent, however, Justice Marshall emphasized that there was no
clear purpose behind Section Two and speculated that it was included in
the Fourteenth Amendment for “political exigency” by Republicans who
wished to either benefit from the votes of black Southerners or, if only
white Southerners were allowed to vote, to dilute Democratic strength once
Confederate states were readmitted to the Union. 99 The majority’s reliance
on coeval laws such as the Reconstruction Act showed nothing more than
that felon disenfranchisement was a common practice at the time.100
“‘[C]onstitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably frozen
like insects trapped in Devonian amber,’” 101 however, thus allowing oneyear residency requirements, specifically permitted in the Reconstruction
Act, to be struck down by the Supreme Court in modern times. 102 Because
voting is a “‘fundamental’ right,”103 any restriction must rise to the level of
a compelling state interest under the Equal Protection Clause.104 Marshall

95. See id. at 54; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down state
residency minimums for voting as violating the Equal Protection Clause); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972) (holding Texas primary election filing fee is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (holding restriction
allowing only taxpaying property owners to vote on municipal bonds violates equal
protection); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (declaring school
district limits on franchise to property owners or lessees or the parents of school-age
children violated the Equal Protection Clause).
96. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 73-74 (quoting William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the
“Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
33, 43-44 (1965) (quoting JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 14 (1909))).
100. Id. at 75.
101. Id. at 76 (quoting Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972)).
102. Id. See supra note 95 for a brief description of Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972), where the Court struck down residency requirements.
103. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 77 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 at 336
(1972)).
104. Id. at 77-78.
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wrote that felon disenfranchisement did not meet this standard because it
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to prevent voter fraud and because
groups of voters could not be excluded based upon presumptions of how
they might vote. 105
Both the majority and the dissent claim the mantle of the democratic
process. Marshall observed that when the suit was filed, twenty-three
states allowed ex-felons to vote. 106 By the time of their decision, four more
states had done so. 107 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, opined
that whatever the merits of the policy arguments against felon
disenfranchisement, it was for state legislatures to pass judgment on the
persuasiveness of those claims. 108
The ability of the states to bar criminals from voting under Section Two,
however, is not without limit. In Hunter v. Underwood, two plaintiffs—
one black, one white— challenged their disenfranchisement for crimes of
moral turpitude, a misdemeanor, on the grounds that section 182 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901 was adopted with the purpose of
disenfranchising blacks and that it had had that effect.109 Alabama
contended that intervening decades and the removal of egregiously racist
provisions of section 182, such as the ban on miscegenation, had erased the
original discriminatory taint. 110
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that nothing in Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment permits intentional racial discrimination which
otherwise violates Section One.111 Although section 182 was facially

105. Id. at 79-83.
106. Id. at 83.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 55.
109. 471 U.S. 222, 223-25 (1985). The district court found that the disenfranchisement
of blacks was a “major purpose” of the state’s constitutional convention, but did not find
that it was the specific motive for the enactment of section 182 and thus found for the
defendants. Id. at 224. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the proper standard for a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of mixed motives was proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a “substantial or motivating factor,”
unless it could be shown the same law would have been enacted in any case. Id. at 225.
The Eleventh Circuit found that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor and that there
was no other alternative explanation. Id. Therefore, Alabama’s constitutional provision as
applied to the plaintiffs was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
110. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232-33. Alabama also claimed that section 182 had an
additional, permissible motivation of disenfranchising poor whites; the Court rejected that
argument. Id. at 230-32.
111. Id. at 233.
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neutral as to race and was equally applied, 112 it had been explicitly enacted
with the purpose of furthering white supremacy, and continued to have that
effect. 113 Alabama had curtailed suffrage prior to 1901, but the state’s
constitutional convention that year expanded the list of enumerated “black”
crimes and added the phrase “crimes of moral turpitude” to broaden
criminal disenfranchisement.114 This had the intended discriminatory
effect: by 1903, ten times as many blacks as whites had been
disenfranchised. 115
The Court rejected an argument that intervening decades and the
removal of explicit racism had legitimated the statute because the original
intent and effect were still present.116 It left open the possibility, however,
that a facially neutral law “might overcome its odious origin” by
amendment. 117 Notably, the Court declined to decide whether section 182
would be constitutional if it were enacted today without any discriminatory
intent. 118
The Hunter court left open the possibility that a law enacted with
discriminatory intent could be subsequently cleansed of that taint by
amendment. 119 In Cotton v. Fordice, the Fifth Circuit addressed the
opening when it denied a Hunter-based challenge to Mississippi’s felon
disenfranchisement law. 120 Although the facially neutral Mississippi law in
question was enacted with discriminatory intent, 121 the court found it had
been cleansed of that intent. 122 The court distinguished Mississippi’s law

112. Id. at 227.
113. Id. at 233. At Alabama’s constitutional convention in 1901, the convention’s
president, John B. Knox, said in his opening address to the delegates, “And what is it that
we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish
white supremacy in this State.” Id. at 229 (quoting John B. Knox et al., 1 OFFICIAL PROC. OF
THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALA. 8 (1940)).
114. Id. at 226-27. The convention specifically targeted those crimes it believed blacks
were more likely to commit, which resulted in disenfranchisement due to crimes of moral
turpitude or other enumerated minor offenses that were “black,” while a conviction of
second-degree manslaughter, a “white” crime, did not lead to disenfranchisement. Id.; see
also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
115. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227.
117. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
118. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
119. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391.
120. Id. at 390. Appellant Keith Brown was denied the right to vote while serving a
prison term for armed robbery. Id. at 389-90. He challenged his disenfranchisement on the
grounds that armed robbery was not specifically enumerated in the applicable statute and
that the law in question was enacted with a racially discriminatory intent. Id.
121. Id. at 391. The state did not dispute this contention.
122. Id.
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from the Alabama law in Hunter because Mississippi voters had
affirmatively expanded their state’s law without discriminatory intent,
whereas the Alabama provision was shorn of discriminatory-intent crimes
by the courts. 123
The Fourth Circuit is in accord on this point. In Allen v. Ellisor, the
court held that South Carolina’s felon disenfranchisement laws were
constitutional because they had been revised and amended since being
enacted eighty years earlier. 124 The court was also persuaded by the
defendant’s argument that the amended laws post-date the Voting Rights
Act and had thus been cleared by the Attorney General. 125 Similarly, in
Howard v. Gilmore, 126 the court dismissed on appeal all claims brought by
a convicted felon attempting to regain his right to vote. 127 The plaintiff
could not show that the state acted with intent to discriminate on the basis
of race as the Virginia statute in question was enacted in 1830, predating
black enfranchisement, nor could the plaintiff demonstrate any connection
between felon disenfranchisement and race.128 Finally, in Perry v.
Beamer, 129 the district court observed that Virginia had disenfranchised
felons since 1830, and had agreed upon readmission to the Union in 1870,
that
the Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to
deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to
vote who are entitled to vote by the Constitution herein recognized, except
as a punishment for such crimes as are now felonies at common

123. Id.
124. 664 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1981). The court stated that the plaintiff had not only
failed to introduce any evidence regarding discriminatory intent in the original statute, but
also neglected to address the state’s felon disenfranchisement laws as amended, referring
only to the original provision. Id.
125. Id. Section Five of the Voting Rights Act includes a pre-clearance provision
whereby certain jurisdictions with a history of discrimination and low voter registration
figures must submit any changes to a voting “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure” to the Attorney General or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000); see also Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69, 69 & n.5 (2003) (explaining the requirements of preclearance).
126. 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
127. Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000)
(emphasis added). Plaintiff brought claims under the First, Fourteenth, Nineteenth, and
Twenty-fourth Amendments, as well as under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Id.
128. Id.
129. 933 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1996).
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law . . . . 130

Following the Fourteenth Amendment by just two years, the framers
were silent if they objected, not just to Virginia’s provision, but to the
“similar, or identical” provisions imposed on each Confederate state upon
readmission. 131
The Supreme Court addressed how a plaintiff may establish a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment in White v. Regester. 132 In 1973, plaintiffs
challenged Texas’s redistricting plan for the state House of Representatives
on the basis that it diluted the voting strength of minorities by creating
large variations in the size of populations between districts and by
establishing multi-member districts in two counties. 133 The claims were
grounded in the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 134 White required the plaintiffs to produce proof of invidious
discrimination; it was their
burden . . . to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question—that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 135

The Court did not find invidious discrimination in the population
variances, 136 but upheld the dismantling of the multi-member districts
given the history of discrimination and its lingering effects on “education,
employment, economics, health, [and] politics” in those localities.137
130. Id. at 559 (quoting Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63). See supra notes 3944 and accompanying text.
131. Perry, 933 F. Supp. at 559.
132. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
133. Id. at 756.
134. Id. at 763.
135. Id. at 765-66.
136. Id. at 763.
137. Id. at 767-69. The court wrote:
Surveying the historic and present condition of the Bexar County MexicanAmerican community . . . the Bexar community, along with other MexicanAmericans in Texas, had long “suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the
results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of
education, employment, economics, health, politics and others.” The bulk of the
Mexican-American community in Bexar County occupied the Barrio, an area
consisting of about twenty-eight contiguous census tracts in the city of San
Antonio. Over seventy-eight percent of Barrio residents were MexicanAmericans, making up twenty-nine percent of the county’s total population. The
Barrio is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income and a high rate of
unemployment. The typical Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language
barrier that makes his participation in community processes extremely difficult,
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Nipper v. Smith elaborated on the White decision, remarking that,
the Supreme Court approved the district court’s use of several objective
factors to determine whether the plaintiffs had met this burden of proof.
Those factors included the state’s history of official racial discrimination;
the use of certain voting structures that, although not in themselves
improper or invidious, nevertheless enhanced the opportunity for racial
discrimination; the influence of all-white political organizations over the
process; and the use of overt racial campaign tactics to defeat candidates
supported by the black community. 138

The issue of the scope of Congress’s remedial powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment arose in City of Boerne v. Flores 139 in 1993.140
The Landmark Commission and City Council of Boerne, Texas denied a
building permit to the Archbishop of San Antonio to expand a missionstyle church because it was part of a historic district. 141 The Archbishop
sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 142 which
prohibited “‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’” free exercise
of religion absent proof the burden was a compelling interest and was the
“‘least restrictive means of furthering’” the interest.143 Congress relied on
its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to impose RFRA
on the states. 144 The Court noted that Congress was not reacting to and did
not document any “widespread pattern of religious discrimination.” 145 For
Congress to act, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.” 146 The Court thus struck down RFRA. 147

particularly, the court thought, with respect to the political life of Bexar County.
“(A) cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with the poll tax and the most
restrictive voter registration procedures in the nation have operated to effectively
deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in Texas . . . .”
Id. at 767-68 (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 728-31 (W.D. Tex. 1972)).
138. 39 F.3d 1494, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994).
139. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
140. Karlan, supra note 74, at 725.
141. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
143. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting § 2000bb-1).
144. Id. at 516.
145. Id. at 531. The Court elaborated further on this point in Board of Trustees of
University of Alabama v. Garrett, stating that Congress must “identify the “history and
pattern” of unconstitutional . . .discrimination” to be remedied. 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001),
discussed in Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2004).
146. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
147. Id. at 511.
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E. Judicial Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act and Congressional
Action
The Supreme Court limited the effect of the Voting Rights Act in 1980
when it required intent to be proven for a violation. 148 In City of Mobile,
Alabama v. Bolden, the city’s black residents challenged the at-large voting
system for electing city commissioners on the grounds that it diluted their
voting strength. 149 The Supreme Court held that Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act “no more than elaborates” on the Fifteenth
Amendment. 150 The Amendment did not confer a new right of suffrage on
anyone; rather, it granted a new right to vote that cannot be infringed due to
discrimination based on race, which Congress is empowered to protect.151
It was already well established that a facially neutral law is only a violation
of the Fifteenth Amendment if it is motivated by discriminatory intent.152
The same holds true for claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment;
it is a “basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can
there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”153 Thus, in its
decision, the Court read an intent requirement into Section Two of the
Voting Rights Act. 154
The new intent requirement established in Bolden was unpopular
because of the burden it placed on plaintiffs. 155 Reaction in Congress came
148. Price, supra note 70, at 385.
149. 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980).
150. Id. at 60-61.
151. Id. at 61-62; see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Neal v. Del. 103
U.S. 370 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
152. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62-63; see also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)
(upholding a gerrymander because discriminatory intent was not proven); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (deeming racially gerrymandered election districts
unconstitutional because they were intended to dilute the black vote); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down a grandfather clause because it lacked any
reasonable basis and had no purpose but to avoid the Fifteenth Amendment).
153. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66.
154. See Price, supra note 70, at 385.
155. See Portugal, supra note 12, at 1328. The Senate Report accompanying the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act comments on the changes:
The proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is designed to
restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bolden. In pre-Bolden cases plaintiffs could prevail
by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total
circumstances of the local electoral process, had the result of denying a racial or
language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process. Under
this results test, it was not necessary to demonstrate that the challenged election
law or procedure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose.
In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent and substantially
increased the burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring
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in the form of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act just two years later,
in 1982. 156 The revised Section Two has a “results test”:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . . 157

A violation is proven if “based on the totality of the circumstances, it is
shown that . . . members [of protected racial minorities] have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”158 This may
be due to either an individual’s denial of the vote based on race or dilution
of a group’s vote based on race. 159
The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments included a list
of “typical factors” that may be relevant in determining whether Section
Two has been violated in the totality of the circumstances.160 These
include any history of official discrimination related to voting rights; racial

proof of discriminatory purpose. The committee has concluded that this intent test
places an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs. It diverts the judicial injury
from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral
process
to
a
historical
question
of
individual
motives.
In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a prerequisite to
establishing a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Therefore, the
committee has amended Section 2 to permit plaintiffs to prove violations by
showing that minority voters were denied an equal chance to participate in the
political process, i.e., by meeting the pr[e]-Bolden results test.
S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15-16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192-93.
156. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1328.
157. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)) (emphasis added).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965). Subsection (b) reads in full:
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to
office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965).
159. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1663, 1671 (2001).
160. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 114 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004).
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polarization in voting; voting laws or practices such as large election
districts that can be used for discrimination; access to the candidate slating
process; ongoing effects of discrimination in “education, employment and
health” affecting political participation; racial appeals in campaigns;
election of minorities to public office; lack of responsiveness by elected
officials to minority concerns; and the policies underlying any voting law
or practice. 161 These factors were derived from White. 162
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the 1982
amendments in Thornburg v. Gingles. 163 Black voters in North Carolina
challenged the use of multi-member districts in a reapportioned legislative
districting plan, claiming it violated their ability to “elect representatives of
their choice” in violation of the amended Section Two of the Voting Rights
Act. 164 After the suit was filed, but before trial, Congress amended Section
Two of the Act to remove any intent requirement established by Bolden
and instead allow a violation to be proven by discriminatory effect.165
When examining the totality of the circumstances for an alleged Section
Two violation of the Act, the Court in Thornburg cautioned that the
“typical factors” identified by the Senate were not exhaustive. 166 The 1982
amendments returned the legal standard to the pre-Bolden “results test” of
White. 167 Except for one district, the Court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that the totality of the circumstances and multi-member voting
districts constituted a violation of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act
because it impaired the ability of black voters to “elect representatives of

161. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
162. “These factors are derived from the analytical framework used by the Supreme
Court in White, as articulated in Zimmer.” S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28 n.113. See supra notes
132-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973);
see also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
163. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
164. Id. at 34-35.
165. Id. at 35.
166. Id. at 45. Thornburg distilled the Senate report factors to the two most important for
vote dilution claims in the context of multi-member electoral districts: “[R]acially polarized
voting and minority electoral success.” Shapiro, supra note 63, at 559 n.122. It established
a three-prong test for establishing a violation under the Voting Rights Act: (1) the minority
group must be “‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a
single-member district,’” (2) the group must be “‘politically cohesive,’” and (3) the
“majority had to vote as a bloc so that it ‘usually . . . defeat[ed] the minority’s preferred
candidate.’” Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51). The Gingles test,
however, probably only applies to the context of districting, not felon disenfranchisement.
Id. (citing BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUALITY 59 (1992)).
167. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 40 n.8.
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their choice.” 168 The Court considered socioeconomic factors such as
income, education, and living conditions. 169
The same year as Thornburg, the Sixth Circuit directly examined felon
disenfranchisement in the totality of the circumstances context. In Wesley
v. Collins, 170 an African-American convict brought suit challenging his
disenfranchisement under Tennessee law as a violation of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act.171 The Sixth
Circuit found no violation of the Voting Rights Act despite the presence of
some plus factors —including disparate impact on blacks and a history of
discrimination—cutting in favor of discriminatory effect, but not in the
totality of the circumstances. 172 Other factors tipped the balance in the
other direction, foremost among which was the fact that there was a
“legitimate and compelling rationale” for disenfranchising felons.173 After
all, a felon’s right to vote is not fundamental.174
F. The Status and Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement Today
Today, forty-eight states have some sort of felon disenfranchisement law

168. Id. at 80.
169. Id. at 65-66.
To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember district in which blacks
and whites possess the same socioeconomic characteristics that the record in this
case attributes to blacks and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2.
The annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and 47.8% of the
black community lives in poverty. More than half— 51.5%—of black adults over
the age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Just over half of black
citizens reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units. And, almost a third
of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only 12.6% of the whites in
the district live below the poverty line. Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042.
White residents are better educated than blacks—only 25.6% of whites over the
age of 25 have only an eighth-grade education or less. Furthermore, only 26.2%
of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in households with no vehicle
available. As is the case in Senate District 2, blacks in this hypothetical urban
district have never been able to elect a representative of their choice.
Id. (citations omitted).
170. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
171. Id. at 1257.
172. Id. at 1261.
173. Id. The court noted the early Lockean rationale of many felon disenfranchisement
laws, to explain that it is rational to exclude lawbreakers from the selection of lawmakers
and law enforcers. Id. at 1261-62 (quoting Green v. Board of Elections of New York, 380
F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967).
174. Id. at 1261; see also Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Plaintiff’s
argument fails because the right of convicted felons to vote is not ‘fundamental’.’ That was
precisely the argument rejected in Richardson”.
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on their books; only Maine and Vermont have no such restriction.175 The
laws range from permanent disenfranchisement in Alabama 176 to automatic
restoration of voting rights upon completion of prison time, parole or
probation in New Mexico. 177 Three states permanently disenfranchise
felons, ten temporarily disenfranchise them, and thirty-six deny the vote to
paroled felons. 178 Even states that “permanently” disenfranchise convicted
felons provide a mechanism for restoration of those rights, however,
usually by application to a board of the executive branch. 179
Currently, approximately 3.9 million people nationwide cannot vote due
to felony convictions; 180 about one in fifty adults. 181 A side effect of high
minority crime rates 182 is that those disenfranchised are disproportionately
black or Hispanic. 183 Nearly 1.4 million black Americans (thirteen percent
of all black men) cannot vote due to felon disenfranchisement. 184 In
Florida and Alabama, nearly one-third of black men cannot vote.185

175. See One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1942. Convicted felons currently serving
prison sentences can vote in Maine and Vermont. Id.
176. See id. at 1943-44.
177. Id. at 1949.
178. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (Sept. 2005), at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.
179. See One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1943. This comment does not explore the
subject of restoration of voting rights and the process entailed therein, but it should be noted
that such an option may be or have been available to many of the plaintiffs discussed here.
See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 106-07 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004); Farrakhan v.
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d
1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003); and Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257.
180. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
181. Pinaire et al., supra note 6, at 1520.
182. Causation of high crime rates by minorities is arguable, whether attributed to
poverty, lack of education, or discrimination. But the statistics clearly establish that African
Americans are arrested at disproportionate rates; in 2003, blacks accounted for 27.0 percent
of arrests. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2003: UNIFORM
CRIME
REPORTS
288
(Oct.
27,
2004),
available
at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf.
African
Americans
are
also
disproportionately victims of crime; for example, 47.8 percent of murder victims in 2003
were black. See id. at 17. African Americans, however, accounted for 12.3 percent of the
American population in 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 U.S. CENSUS: PEOPLE
QUICKFACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Sept. 30,
2005). “These disparities are probably due in part to underlying disparities in criminal
behavior.” ADVISORY BOARD TO THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE, ONE AMERICA IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE: THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON RACE: THE
ADVISORY BOARD’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 77 (Sept. 1998), at
http://clinton2.nara.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica/PIR.pdf.
183. Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD.
85, 86 (2004); see also Price, supra note 70, at 374-75 & n. 17.
184. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 370.
185. See Price, supra note 70, at 375.
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African American men as a group account for nearly thirty-six percent of
all those disenfranchised nationwide. 186
II. CONFLICT AND CHAOS IN THE CIRCUITS
A. Second Circuit: Baker v. Pataki and Muntaqim v. Coombe
The Second Circuit first examined the issue of felon disenfranchisement
in the context of the Voting Rights Act in Baker v. Pataki. 187 The district
court refused to apply the results test of the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act, and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. 188 On
appeal, five judges concluded that the results test of Section Two did not
reach New York’s law due to concerns that it would “raise serious
constitutional questions regarding the scope of Congress’ authority to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”189 The court was
evenly split, five-to-five. 190
Judge Mahoney wrote that the framers of the Voting Rights Act and its
1982 amendments did not intend to outlaw felon disenfranchisement191 and
had not found that felon disenfranchisement laws were a pretext for racial
discrimination. 192 The legislative history from 1965 of both houses of
Congress was explicit on this point: “[The Voting Rights Act] ‘does not
proscribe a requirement of a State or any political subdivision of a State
that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of conviction
of a felony.’” 193 Further, applying Section Two’s results test to a felon
disenfranchisement statute would raise constitutional issues.194 Although
the test was enacted using the enforcement mechanisms of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, it is “settled” that those amendments can be
violated only where there is purposeful discrimination. 195 Where a statute
may act to upset the normal balance of Constitutional federalism, a “clear
statement” from Congress is required that that is in fact the intended
186. Id. at 374-75.
187. 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (5-5 decision).
188. Id. at 921. See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Portugal, supra
note 12, at 1329. When the litigation began, then-Governor Mario Cuomo was the
defendant; he was replaced by Governor George Pataki. Baker, 85 F.3d at 923 n.4.
189. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d at 922.
190. Id. at 921.
191. Id. at 932.
192. Id. at 929.
193. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 11-12 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2437, 2457).
194. Id. at 922.
195. Id. at 926.
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result. 196 Applying the “plain statement rule,” since Congress was not
unmistakably clear that it wanted to alter the balance between the state and
federal governments, the Voting Rights Act should not be so construed.197
Judge Feinberg took the opposing view. 198 He contended that Congress
is empowered to take remedial action under the Fourteenth Amendment
where there is a racially discriminatory result.199 Since the Court had
already struck down a felon disenfranchisement law based on race under
the Fourteenth Amendment in Hunter v. Underwood, he saw no reason why
Congress could not use its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to “bar racially discriminatory results” under the
Voting Rights Act. 200 The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to
upset the balance between the state and federal governments and had
already had that effect.201 This renders the “plain statement rule” question
moot, since the federal balance had already been altered. 202 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has already said that the “plain statement rule” does not
apply to Section Two of the Voting Rights Act and would, in any case,
would only apply if the statute were vague, which it is not. 203
The split in the Baker decision left the status of felon disenfranchisement
unsettled in the Second Circuit. In Muntaqim v. Coombe, Jalil Muntaqim, a
black felon, brought suit against New York State Correctional Services for
denying him the right to vote. 204 He claimed New York’s statute violated
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act because it “results in a denial or
196. Id. at 930; see NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its
intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”) (quoting Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
197. Baker, 85 F.3d at 922.
198. Id. at 934.
199. Id. at 937.
200. Id. For a discussion of the Hunter decision, see supra notes 109-118 and
accompanying text.
201. Baker, 85 F.3d at 938; see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
202. Baker, 85 F.3d at 938-39.
203. Id.; see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 390-404 (1991) (interpreting of the
Voting Rights Act without reference to the plain statement rule). Judge Mahoney’s
response in Baker was that
[i]n light of the unequivocal language in Gregory that the plain statement rule
does apply in the context of legislation passed pursuant to the enforcement clauses
of the Civil War Amendments, we decline to interpret this omission—made
without any attempt to distinguish Gregory—as an instruction to the lower courts
to refrain from applying Gregory in the context of the Voting Rights Act.
85 F.3d at 932.
204. 366 F.3d 102, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2004).
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abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.” 205 In a unanimous decision, the court held that
the Voting Rights Act did not reach New York’s felon disenfranchisement
law, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit validation of the
practice in Section Two, its widespread use since before the Civil War, and
the principle that laws should not be construed to alter the balance of
federalism unless Congress demands so explicitly. 206
The court reasoned that the Voting Rights Act did not totally eliminate
the need to show purposeful discrimination because the 1982 amendments
eliminated the intent requirement of Bolden and returned to the pre-Bolden
standard, which required proof of invidious discrimination, as the court
held in White v. Regester. 207 Under White, the plaintiff does not have to
show subjective discriminatory intent on the part of lawmakers, but instead
“objective factors” are used to demonstrate an “electoral scheme interacts
with racial bias in the community and allows that bias to dilute the voting
strength of the minority group.” 208 Applying this standard, the court found
that the statistics proffered by the plaintiff did not prove there was a
relationship between being black and being disenfranchised; they only
showed that a disproportionate number of blacks have been disenfranchised
on the basis of their status as felons. 209 It cautioned, however, that
evidence of discrimination in the “prosecution or sentencing of felons”
might prove that felons have been disenfranchised on account of race.210
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2004. 211 After initially denying
205. Id. at 104 (quoting Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).
Specifically, Muntaqim asserted that even if the New York legislature did not intend to
discriminate, the statute violates the Voting Rights Act because it results in a “dilution” of
black and Hispanic voters in New York City. He also claimed that the disparity in prison
populations—blacks and Hispanics are 30% of the state’s population, but constitute eighty
percent of its prisoners—is caused by discriminatory sentencing. Furthermore, he asserted
that because more than eighty percent of blacks and Hispanics in state prisons hail from
New York City and its vicinity, not only is he disenfranchised, but the minority vote in New
York City is diluted; both are in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 105.
206. Id. at 104.
207. Id. at 116-17. The court cited the following statement to the Senate Judiciary
Committee: “The proposed amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is designed to
restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bolden.” Id. at 117-18 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 15 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 192).
208. Id. at 117 (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) and
discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973)). See supra notes 132-138 and
accompanying text.
209. 366 F.3d at 116-17.
210. Id. at 117.
211. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004), denying cert. to 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2004).
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the petition, 212 the Second Circuit agreed in December 2004 to a rehearing
en banc. 213
B. Ninth Circuit: Farrakhan v. Washington
The previous year, the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion in
Farrakhan v. Washington. 214 In Farrakhan, minority felons in Washington
sued the state for a violation of Section Two of the Voting Rights Act,
claiming that the state’s felon disenfranchisement law was a race-based
denial of their right to vote. 215
The district court granted summary judgment for the state because,
although minorities were disproportionately disenfranchised, the cause of
that disparity was “external” to the . . .law” and thus was not the causal link
between the voter’s qualification and the discriminatory result. 216 It found
that while there was evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice
system, it was insignificant in the totality of the circumstances because the
statute was not enacted with discriminatory intent and the provision itself
did not have that effect.217 The felons appealed. 218
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the totality of the
circumstances, noting that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
had been intended by Congress to remove the plaintiff’s burden of proving
discriminatory intent.219 If the felon disenfranchisement provision had to
be discriminatory itself, there would be no point in examining the totality
of the circumstances. 220 Such a standard would, in effect, reinsert a
discriminatory intent requirement into the Voting Rights Act.221 The court
accepted the plaintiff’s contention that the state had “tenuous policy
justifications” for its felon disenfranchisement law. 222 It held that Section
212. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 2004), denying reh’g en banc to 366
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004).
213. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), granting reh’g en banc to 366
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004).
214. 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
215. Id. at 1011.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1014-15.
220. Id. at 1018.
221. Id. at 1019.
222. Id. at 1020 n.15. The court noted with approval the district court’s citation of
Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224-26 (9th Cir. 1972)), for its discussion of the
policies underlying felon disenfranchisement. The court also agreed with the district court
that although Dillenburg is no longer good law, it remains “applicable” in terms of its policy
analysis. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1020, n.15.
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Two of the Voting Rights Act does reach felon disenfranchisement because
it is a voting qualification and Section Two covers any voting qualification
denying the right to vote in a discriminatory manner. 223 States may
disenfranchise felons without violating the Fourteenth Amendment under
Richardson, but when it results in the denial of the right to vote or in a vote
dilution based on race, the Voting Rights Act provides a remedy for
disenfranchised persons on that basis. 224 The court remanded the case to
the district court for a re-examination of the interplay between
discrimination in the criminal justice system and felon disenfranchisement
within the totality of the circumstances. 225
When the petition for a rehearing was denied,226 Judge Kozinzki noted
in his dissent that the plaintiffs never produced any evidence except
statistical disparities,227 which was insufficient for a Section Two claim
because “causation cannot be inferred from impact alone.” 228 Moreover,
he argued that the Voting Rights Act did not reach felon
disenfranchisement because Congress had no such intent, and applying it
that expansively would raise constitutional questions about Congress’s
remedial reach under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 229
The intensity of Judge Kozinski’s dissent was fueled by his perception
that the court had endangered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act. 230 He pointed out that while Section Two has been presumed
constitutional, it has never actually been held to be so by the Supreme
Court has never ruled on this question. 231 The Court has traditionally
interpreted the Voting Rights Act narrowly based on constitutionality

223. Id. at 1016.
224. Id. For a discussion of Richardson v. Ramirez, see supra notes 83-108 and
accompanying text.
225. Id. at 1011-12.
226. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), denying reh’g to 338 F.3d
1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
227. Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1118; see Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring plaintiffs to prove more than statistical disparities in
unrelated areas for a Section Two violation); Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the City
Comm’rs, 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring a “causal connection” between the electoral
qualification law and the discrimination resulting in a denial of voting rights); Salas v. S.W.
Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a Section Two claim
because the disparity in school board voter turnout rates was not caused by discrimination).
229. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1120-24.
230. Id. at 1124.
231. Id.; see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that the Court has assumed, without directly addressing, the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act, and citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
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concerns. 232
C. Eleventh Circuit: Johnson v. Governor of Florida
Litigation in the Eleventh Circuit has been closely scrutinized because
the Johnson 233 case implicates election law in Florida, where President
Bush clinched the presidency by such a small margin in 2000.234 Unlike
Muntaqim in New York and Farrakhan in Washington, Johnson was
decided in a southern state whose history and laws are more likely to
exhibit manifestations of past racism.
The Eleventh Circuit considered claims under both the Voting Rights
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment in Johnson v. Governor of Florida.235
The plaintiffs 236 alleged that the felon disenfranchisement provision in the
Florida Constitution of 1868 was adopted with discriminatory intent,
continues to carry that intent despite its re-enactment in 1968, and
continues to have the intended discriminatory effect. 237
For a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to be established,
discriminatory intent must be proven as a “substantial or motivating
factor”;” 238 disparate impact alone is not enough. 239 Because past intent
can carry into the future despite amendment or lack of current intent, where
current impact is still evident,240 the court launched into an extensive
232. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1124; see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320,
321-22 (2000) (refusing to adopt appellants’ interpretation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act because such a reading would exacerbate “federalism costs” to the point of raising
constitutionality concerns).
233. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
234. See generally Litwin, supra note 10.
235. 353 F.3d at 1292.
236. A New York civil rights group, The Brennan Center, and Florida attorneys filed the
case on behalf of disenfranchised felons in Florida. Litwin, supra note 10, at 236.
237. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1293.
238. Id.; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977).
239. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1293. The court dramatically illustrated the disparate impact
felon disenfranchisement has in Florida: More than 600,000 people cannot vote, and 10.5
percent of voting age black Floridians are in this group, as opposed to 4.4 percent of the
non-black population. In all, one in six black men in Florida is disenfranchised. Id.
240. Id. at 1294. The decision cites a number of cases, most of which regard school
desegregation, to make its point about original intent surviving through time. Id. at 1294 n.5
(citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors,
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1997); Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir.
1989); Brown v. Bd. of School Comm’rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), aff’d, 706
F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1983), aff’d, 464 U.S. 807 (1983); and McMillan v. Escambia County,
638 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1981)). These cases can be distinguished on a number of grounds.
For example, Kirksey, Irby, and Brown all imply “neutral” action or lack of serious
amendment of the law in question. See id. The Feeney case “impl[ies], in an equal
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discussion of the history of Florida’s felon disenfranchisement
provision. 241
The Johnson court savaged Florida’s 1868 felon disenfranchisement
provision. It noted that when the state’s constitutional convention was
initially controlled by Radical Republicans, felon disenfranchisement was
omitted.242 However, moderate Republicans subsequently gained control
of the convention and reinstated it.243 The court noted that two convention
delegates bragged about their restriction of the black vote, though it
acknowledged that it was debatable whether these boasts referred to the
Constitution as a whole or to the felon disenfranchisement provisions
specifically. 244
As Judge Kravitch pointed out in her dissent, however, Florida first
denied felons the vote in 1838. 245 Almost thirty years later, in 1865, the
state’s first post-Civil War Constitution still denied blacks the vote and thus
had to be replaced in 1868. 246 At least five black delegates at the 1868
convention supported the felon disenfranchisement provision. 247 Kravitch
considered the racist comments of a few delegates to the 1868 convention
as not contextually relevant to the specific provision in question. 248
The majority’s Voting Rights Act analysis used the results test, in view
of the totality of the circumstances, including “social and historical
conditions.” 249 The court held that the district court erred when it rejected
plaintiffs’ voting rights claims by misapplying the totality of the
protection claim, that the purpose of the current Massachusetts veterans preference law may
be located in its 1896 origins despite a number of amendments, including eliminations and
extensions.” Id. The Massachusetts law was frequently amended only to include the
veterans of new wars and conflicts being fought, however, but was otherwise “substantially
the same.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 267. Further, the “purpose of the current . . . law” as
regards the “women’s requisitions” exemption, “dates back to the 1896 veterans’ preference
law and was retained in the law substantially unchanged until it was eliminated in 1971.”
Id. at 266 n. 22. Johnson, however, is distinguishable because it involved a law that was
neither initially discriminatory nor was it substantially unchanged over time. See infra notes
340-347 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Judge Kravitch’s dissent points out that
these cited cases are inapposite because “this circuit has been reluctant to extend the
education line of cases to other areas. As this court stated in Burton v. City of Belle Glade,
178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999), school desegregation jurisprudence is unique and thus
difficult to apply in other contexts.” Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1313.
241. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1294-96.
242. Id. at 1295.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1296.
245. Id. at 1308.
246. Id. at 1309 (noting that the 1868 replacement still denied felons the right to vote).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1309 n.2.
249. Id. at 1303-04.
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circumstances standard to the evidence. 250 Thus, its conclusion that their
disenfranchisement was due to their conviction as felons—not racial
discrimination—was incorrect. 251
The court rejected the contention that the Voting Rights Act does not
reach felon disenfranchisement. 252 It explained that Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act are compatible because
non-discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws that are racially neutral
both on their face and as applied would pass muster. 253 In remanding the
case, the court concluded that the taint of racism behind Florida’s 1868
felon disenfranchisement provision constituted a violation of equal
protection, unless it could be shown that it was cleansed by subsequent
amendment. 254 It suggested that this could not be demonstrated, as there
was no “legitimate policy reason” to have kept felon disenfranchisement in
the 1968 constitution. 255
Judge Kravitch’s dissent attacked the majority’s ruling on both
Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act grounds. 256 She wrote that
Florida’s felon disenfranchisement law had been cleansed of any racist
intent when it was reenacted by the constitutional convention of 1968.257
She echoed Muntaqim and Judge Kozinski’s dissent in the Eleventh
District in stating that the Voting Rights Act was never intended to reach
felon disenfranchisement—in either its 1965 or 1982 incarnations—and
that the majority’s interpretation would allow a statute to trump a
constitutional amendment. 258
The Eleventh Circuit vacated Johnson in July 2004 and granted a
rehearing en banc. 259

250. Id. at 1304-05.
251. See id. at 1305.
252. Id. at 1306.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1301.
255. Id. at 1301 n.16. The opinion claims that “a few courts” have proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to deny suffrage to felons and cites Green v. Board of Elections of
New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), and Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585
(1884). It then says “others” have questioned those rationales, citing Marshall’s dissent in
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79-82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Farrakhan v.
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash. 1997), and Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp.
1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970). It goes on to cite a number of law review articles, but no
Supreme Court cases. Id.
256. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1308.
257. Id. at 1309-14.
258. Id. at 1314-15.
259. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004), granting reh’g to and
vacating 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
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D. Current Status of the Conflict
In 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Farrakhan260 and
Muntaqim 261 cases. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its holding in
Johnson and has granted a full rehearing en banc.262 The Second Circuit
followed suit in December 2004, granting a rehearing en banc for
Muntaqim. 263 Whatever the outcome in the Eleventh Circuit, Johnson will
almost assuredly reach the Supreme Court. 264 Indeed, while the Court was
considering Farrakhan and Muntaqim, briefs were filed with the Court
asking it to deny certiorari and instead wait for the Johnson case, as it may
present a clearer presentation of the issue.265
III. ANALYSIS
The confusion in the circuits reveals some of the underlying
controversies regarding felon disenfranchisement. It is well established
that felon disenfranchisement is permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment unless a law was enacted with discriminatory intent.266 Less
clear are the issues of whether the Voting Rights Act reaches felon
disenfranchisement 267 and what is the proper standard for measuring when
a felon disenfranchisement law has been cleansed of prior discriminatory
intent. Opponents of felon disenfranchisement may well be disappointed in
the results of their litigation strategy. 268 Such a failure will then refocus the
260. Farrakhan v. Wash., 125 S. Ct. 477 (2004), denying cert. to 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir.
2003).
261. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004), denying cert. to 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2004).
262. Johnson, 377 F.3d at 1163-64.
263. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004), granting reh’g in banc to 366
F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004).
264. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Declines to Hear 2 Cases Weighing the
Right of Felons to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A19.
265. Id.
266. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1996). Judge Feinberg agreed on this
point in his dissent, noting that “States have the right to disenfranchise felons; § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes that clear. States, however, do not have the right to
disenfranchise felons on the basis of race.” Id. at 937 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
267. See Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2004).
268. “To the extent Davis held that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote, its
holding is . . . unexceptionable.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (citing Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 535 (1886)). Perhaps the first appearance of the strategy for eliminating
felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act is Andrew Shapiro’s note,
Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy,
published in the 1993 Yale Law Journal. See generally Shapiro, supra note 63 (emphasis
added). In his Note, Shapiro elucidated his “new litigation strategy.” Id. at 543.
In part, this litigation strategy is a belated response to the intentionally racist use
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issue on the policy rationales for the practice and move the issue back to its
proper forum in the state legislatures.
A. The Voting Rights Act Does Not Reach Felon Disenfranchisement
The question is not whether Congress had the power to enact the Voting
Rights Act, but whether the Voting Rights Act reaches felon
disenfranchisement under Congress’s powers. 269 States have primary
responsibility for criminal law and for regulating elections. 270 If the
provision in question is just a way of punishing felons, allowing the Voting
Rights Act to reach it would invade the states’ traditional jurisdiction. 271 In
addition, it would be inconsistent for the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to permit felon disenfranchisement in Section Two, but allow
Congress to prohibit it without evidence of discrimination or discriminatory
intent. 272
Congress must have been aware of felon disenfranchisement when it
passed the Voting Rights Act; thus, its silence cannot be interpreted as an
intent to reach these laws. 273 Congressional reports from 1965 provide that
tests for morality or good standing with regard to voting should be
scrutinized, but felon disenfranchisement laws should not. 274 The Judiciary
Committee stated that the “ban on historically discriminatory ‘tests or
devices,’ including the prohibition on tests for ‘good moral character’” did
not implicate felon disenfranchisement laws. 275 Senator Tydings of
Maryland remarked that felon disenfranchisement is of a different character
than literary tests or other such tools. “Let me emphasize that [the Voting
of criminal disenfranchisement throughout the South a century ago. In practical
terms, it is a plan that relies on the fact that criminal disenfranchisement laws have
a disproportionate impact on minority offenders. But the goal of this strategy, as
stated at the outset of this Note, is not to make disenfranchisement laws “race
neutral” or even primarily to reverse the disenfranchisement of nonwhite
offenders. Rather, the goal is to harness the power of the Voting Rights Act’s
results test to attack criminal disenfranchisement laws where they are most
vulnerable. If construed properly, the Act could go a long way toward abolishing
criminal disenfranchisement and restoring the right to vote to a class of millions of
powerless citizens.
Id. at 566. Roger Clegg describes Shapiro’s article as a “key movement source.” Clegg,
supra note 14.
269. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 121.
270. Id. at 121-22.
271. Id. at 122.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 123-24.
274. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2003).
275. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-162, at 24
(1965), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562).
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Rights Act] does not include a requirement that an applicant for voting or
registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony or mental
disability . . . . [t]hese grounds for disqualification are objective, easily
applied, and do not lend themselves to fraudulent manipulation.”276
Richardson’s emphasis on the “controlling significance” of the framers’
intent 277 should be no less true in construing the Voting Rights Act than in
construing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Critics point to Congress’s reaction after Bolden in amending the Voting
Rights Act to eliminate any intent requirement for Section Two claims;278
yet Bolden was not a felon disenfranchisement case. 279 Furthermore,
nothing in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments indicates that
Congress intended Section Two to reach felon disenfranchisement. 280
Applying the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement does indeed
“raise serious constitutional questions.” 281 In Boerne, the Supreme Court
struck down a law because it expanded the scope of Congress’s remedial
abilities under the Fourteenth Amendment. 282 Similarly, the results test of
Section Two of the Voting Rights Act was enacted using the enforcement
mechanisms of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, yet it is
“settled” that those amendments can only be violated where there is
purposeful discrimination. 283 If the Voting Rights Act reaches felon
disenfranchisement and Section Two of the Act does not require a showing
of purposeful intent, its scope is broader than the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments; consequently, the results test would reach conduct that does
not necessarily violate those amendments.
Judge Feinberg wrote in Baker that Congress is empowered to take
remedial action under the Fourteenth Amendment where there is a racially
Further, he stated the Reconstruction
discriminatory result.284
Amendments were meant to upset the balance between the state and federal
276. Id. at 930 (quoting 111 CONG. REC. S8,366 (1965)).
277. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 154-162, 165 and accompanying text.
279. Bolden concerned an at-large voting system in municipal elections. City of Mobile,
Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980).
280. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 2003). In Baker v.
Pataki, Judge Mahoney stated that the framers of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and of the
1982 amendments did not intend to outlaw felon disenfranchisement and did not find that
felon disenfranchisement laws were a pretext for racial discrimination. Baker, 85 F.3d at
929-32; accord Farrakhan v. Wash., 359 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2004).
281. Baker, 85 F.3d at 922.
282. See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
283. Baker, 85 F.3d at 926 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 937.

BROOKSCHRISTENSEN

134

2/3/2011 10:06 PM

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XXXII

governments and already had that effect. 285 Yet Boerne instructs us that
Congress may exercise its enforcement powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments only when addressing a pattern of violations with a remedy
that is congruent and proportional. 286 First, there must be a judicially
protected right with a history and pattern of violations, documented by
Congress, before Congress can enact appropriate legislation aimed at
remedying it. 287 Congress has put forth no such evidence concerning felon
disenfranchisement, or even claimed that such laws discriminate.288
Instead, when Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 289 to facilitate voter registration, it explicitly recognized felon status
as a legitimate basis for a state to deny voting rights.290 Second, the
remedy must be congruent and proportional. 291 The Voting Rights Act as
applied to felon disenfranchisement laws is too broad, too blunt and too
attenuated. 292 Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Farrakhan, stating that the
majority has endangered the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act,
may prove prescient. 293
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Passes Muster Under the Voting Rights
Act
Even assuming that the Voting Rights Act reaches felon
disenfranchisement, denying felons suffrage would still pass muster
because statistical evidence of disparate impact alone is not enough for a
violation.
Moreover, a causal connection between felon
disenfranchisement laws and discrimination based on race cannot be
demonstrated in the totality of the circumstances.
1. Causation
As stated in Farrakhan, “causation cannot be inferred from impact
alone.” 294 Although the word “results” does appear in the Voting Rights
285. Id. at 938; see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980).
286. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 120; see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
287. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 120; see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365 (2001).
288. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 125.
289. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg (1993).
290. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 125-26.
291. Id. at 120.
292. Id. at 124-25.
293. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
294. Id. at 1118; see Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109
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Act, it does not proscribe all voting qualifications which have a racially
disproportionate impact. 295 There must be a connection between the voter
qualification and the alleged discrimination that results in the denial of the
right to vote. 296
None of the recent circuit cases have demonstrated this connection.
Farrakhan and Johnson both purported to, but the rancorous dissents to
both decisions cast doubt on these claims. 297 For example, the plaintiffs in
Farrakhan did not dispute five of the eight claims the state made in its
statement of material facts to support its motion for summary judgment.298
Instead, “[t]o substantiate their vote denial claim . . . [p]laintiffs presented
statistical evidence of the disparities in arrest, bail and pre-trial release
rates, charging decisions, and sentencing outcomes in certain aspects of
Washington’s criminal justice system.” 299
There may be a correlation between being black and being a
disenfranchised felon but that does not mean it is because of race, only that
more African-Americans are disenfranchised on account of their status as
felons. 300 Felons are disenfranchised upon their “conscious decision” to
break the law, “for which they assume the risks of detection and
punishment,” not because of their race.301 This is the fundamental point—
it is felons, not minorities, that are disenfranchised by these laws. The high
percentage of minorities in prison is a cause for serious concern, but the
“ability of the judiciary to confront the underlying reasons for this
phenomenon is limited.” 302

F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997).
295. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116. “A violation of § 1973 occurs only when ‘a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives.’” Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986)).
296. Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
297. Kozinski’s dissent in Farrakhan claimed that the plaintiff had “produced only
evidence of statistical disparities in an area external to voting.” Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at
1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). In Johnson, Kravitch’s dissent responded to the majority’s
extensive recitation of the racial impact of felon disenfranchisement in Florida by
emphasizing that plaintiff’s evidence was entirely comprised of statistical disparities,
insufficient to establish a causal connection. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287,
1318 n.16 (11th Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
298. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2003). The claims disputed
by the plaintiff regarded the operation of felon disenfranchisement laws and American
Indians. Id.
299. Id.
300. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 116-17.
301. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986).
302. Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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2. Totality of the Circumstances
Because a causal connection between felon disenfranchisement laws and
intentional discrimination resulting in a loss of the right to vote or voting
dilution on account of race is difficult to establish, some courts have
attempted to shoehorn their analyses into the rubric of “totality of the
circumstances” analysis. This, however, is entirely vague, 303 and leads to
incongruous results depending on what is encompassed within the meaning
of the phrase “totality of the circumstances.”
The Senate Report provides a list of “typical factors” to be considered in
the totality of the circumstances test, but it is not exhaustive and is lacking
a mechanical formula for applying them. 304 Further, the list is not
controlling, leading to analyses which are highly individualistic and factintensive. 305 Johnson noted that the plaintiffs produced evidence as to
racially-polarized voting, a history of official discrimination, the use of
voting procedures to reduce minority participation, and disparate effects
from education, employment, and health.306 In contrast, the Farrakhan
court considered discrimination in the criminal justice system in the context
of the discrimination under the “education, employment, and health”
factor. 307 It found a violation given how the challenged voting practice
“interacts with external factors such as ‘social and historical conditions’”
that result in disenfranchisement on the basis of race.308
While the Senate Report’s list of “typical factors” are not exhaustive, if
discrimination in the criminal justice system is as pervasive as alleged, it is
worth noting that Congress did not include it on the list. 309 Even if there is
evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system, felon
disenfranchisement laws would not violate Section Two of the Voting
Rights Act because the discrimination would be in the criminal justice
system, not in the disenfranchisement statutes themselves. Discrimination
in the criminal justice system does not establish that blacks have “less
opportunity . . . to elect legislators of their choice.” 310 In White311 and
303. See Goosby v. Town Bd., 180 F.3d 476, 500 (2d Cir. 1999) (Leval, J., concurring)
(noting that “[t]his standard is exceptionally vague. . . .[And the] specified factors [in the
Senate Report] . . . give little guidance as to what constitutes a violation of the act.”), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1138 (2000).
304. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260.
305. Id.
306. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003).
307. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003).
308. Id. at 1011-12.
309. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the criminal
justice system was not “isolated” as a factor by Congress).
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005).
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Gingles, the Supreme Court recognized that discrimination in education,
employment, and health can lead to violations of the Voting Rights Act.312
Both of these cases are more than twenty years old, neither was a criminal
case, and both had a multitude of other factors present.313 In contrast, in
Muntaqim, Farrakhan and Johnson, none of the plaintiffs pleaded other
factors. Indeed, they could not have done so because a quick survey of
typical factors such as racially-polarized voting, access to candidate slating
procedures, large election districts, racial appeals in campaigns, and the
responsiveness of elected officials inter alia, reveals them to be
substantially related to elections and voting directly—not to crime or the
criminal justice system. White and Gingles each dealt with the effects of
discrimination on voting and elections directly, not through an intermediate
step, such as the criminal justice system. 314
The “totality of the circumstances” analyses employed in Johnson and
Farrakhan were less than total. Both courts failed to consider that the
history of felon disenfranchisement makes it fundamentally different than
voting qualifications which were expressly used to deny black suffrage.315
As the Baker court noted, “Prior to 1890, apparently no Southern State
required proof of literacy, understanding of constitutional provisions or of
the obligations of citizenship, or good moral character, as prerequisites to
voting. . . . However . . . these tests and devices were soon to appear in
most of the States with large Negro populations.”316 Yet at the time the
311. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1973).
312. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 65-66 (1986); see Kirksey v. Bd. of Supervisors,
554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977).
As proof of denial of access to the Hinds County political process, the plaintiffs
presented substantial unrefuted evidence showing a past record of racial
discrimination engaged in by the county and of official unresponsiveness to the
needs of the county’s black citizens . . . . We will not restate [the evidence] but
briefly note that it included the existence of these factors: no black’s [sic] ever
having been elected to Hinds County office; poll taxes and literacy tests as
impediments to voting; segregation principles adopted by political parties;
property ownership requirements to run for offices; disproportionate education,
employment, income level and living conditions between whites and blacks in
Hinds County; alleged bloc voting; requirement of a majority for election;
prohibition against single-shot voting; systematic exclusion of blacks from juries;
levy and maintenance of taxes for a dual school system. In short plaintiffs proved
the presence in Hinds County of almost every significant factor indicative of
denial of access to the political process.
Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143-44.
313. For discussions of White and Gingles, see supra notes 132-138, 163-169 and
accompanying text.
314. See id.
315. See supra notes 219-229, 245-251 and accompanying text.
316. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 929 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, eighty percent of all states
had already disenfranchised felons. 317 The purpose of those laws could not
have been to evade the Amendment. 318 Further, there are “legitimate and
compelling rationale[s]” for disenfranchising felons. 319
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement portray the practice as
originating sui generis in the South as part of an overarching and
They are willfully
continuing scheme to subjugate blacks.320
misrepresenting history. 321 Today, twelve states fully disenfranchise
felons, and only four are former Confederate states. 322 Some of the
“harshest” of these laws are in states that were never part of the
Confederacy and have very small black populations. 323 For example,
Wyoming’s population is only 0.8 percent black324 and Iowa’s only 2.1
percent. 325 Moreover, none of the laws that were enacted in the South after

11-12 (1965), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2443).
317. Clegg, supra note 14.
318. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
319. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Wesley,
see the text accompanying notes 170-174.
320. See, e.g., One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at 1944 (“Florida, like Alabama, has
denied the franchise to convicted felons since Reconstruction.”). While perhaps technically
true, this proposition ignores the promises regarding felon disenfranchisement in Florida’s
1838 and 1865 constitutions.
See supra notes 245-246.
Additionally, felon
disenfranchisement in Alabama dates back to 1819. See supra note 19.
321. See Clegg, supra note 14.
Brent Staples, the ‘Editorial Observer’ for the New York Times, wrote recently
that ‘legal scholars attribute [felon disenfranchisement] to this country’s
difficulties with race.’ This summer the Washington Post said these laws ‘are a
vestige of a time when states sought to discourage blacks from voting.’ USA
Today had earlier editorialized, ‘Voting bans are rooted in the nation’s racist past.’
And recently a Reuters story (corrected after I talked with them) asserted that
these laws ‘have roots in the post-Civil War 19th century and were aimed at
preventing black Americans from voting.’ But it is simply not true that the reason
felons are disenfranchised in the United States is because of a desire to keep
blacks from voting. The reason our bien pensants are making assertions to the
contrary is perhaps because they are being misled by the well-funded and
ubiquitous felon-reenfranchisement movement.
Id.
322. Bill “to Secure the Federal Voting Rights of Persons Who Have Been Released from
Incarceration”: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Roger Clegg, Vice President and
General Counsel, Center for Equal Opportunity), [hereinafter Clegg, H.R. 906 Statement],
available at http://www.ceousa.org/clegg2.html (Oct. 21, 1999).
323. See Clegg, supra note 14.
324. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: WYOMING, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/56000.html (last revised Sept. 30, 2005).
325. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS: IOWA, available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19000.html (last revised Sept. 30, 2005).
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Reconstruction with the intent to disenfranchise blacks are still on the
books today. 326
B. The Fourteenth Amendment is Controlling
If the Voting Rights Act does not reach felon disenfranchisement, then
the Fourteenth Amendment is the controlling standard for such laws. The
definitiveness of the Richardson court’s “affirmative sanction” seems to
have foreclosed all challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless
discriminatory intent can be shown. 327
The proper balance has already been struck between legitimate felon
disenfranchisement and that which is unconstitutionally motivated by racial
bias.
Richardson v. Ramirez allows the states to enact felon
disenfranchisement laws as expressly provided for in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 328 Hunter v. Underwood constrains this practice, so that
where a state has disenfranchised felons as a method of surreptitiously
denying black people the right to vote, it can be struck down. 329 Prior
intent, however, can be undone by subsequent amendment. 330 This is not
only a reasonable approach, but one that is consistent with the letter and the
spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, our history, and with so-called
“evolving standards of decency.” 331 It is important to note that “past
discrimination . . . in the manner of original sin, [cannot] condemn
governmental action that is not itself unlawful,”332 and that forty-eight
states currently practice felon disenfranchisement. 333 It should continue as
the constitutional standard.
The question then becomes: “When has a racially tainted law been
cleansed of prior discriminatory intent?” In Hunter v. Underwood, the
Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that the proper standard for a

326. See Clegg, supra note 14.
327. See Price, supra note 70, at 383-84.
328. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
329. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). See supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
330. See generally Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998). For a discussion of
Fordice, see supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
331. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Interestingly, the now familiar phrase
“evolving standards of decency” originates in a case that cites felons as an example of a
permissible reason for disenfranchisement. Id. at 96-97 (“A person who commits bank
robbery, for instance, loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote . . . . [B]ecause the
purpose of the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this
law is sustained as a[n] . . . exercise of the power to regulate the franchise.”); cf. supra note
76 and accompanying text.
332. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980).
333. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of mixed motives
was a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a “substantial
or motivating factor,” unless it can be shown the same law would have
been enacted regardless. 334
Because Hunter did not decide whether or not revisions to Alabama’s
felon disenfranchisement law by the courts had expunged the original taint
of racism, this question was left open. 335 Fordice used this opening to find
that Mississippi’s felon disenfranchisement law had been sanitized of the
discriminatory intent evident at the time of its enactment. 336 The court
focused on the fact that the law was broadened in 1968 when “white”
crimes, such as rape and murder, were added to the list. 337 This change
was approved by both houses of the state legislature and subsequently by
the voters. 338
The Johnson court used Hunter to set an impossibly high bar for
Florida’s original felon
cleansing discriminatory intent.339
disenfranchisement law predates black enfranchisement, thus precluding
any racial intent in the original law as only white men had the franchise at
that time. 340 Yet the court glossed over the law’s 1838 origins and its
inclusion in the 1865 constitution and instead discussed the law as it dated
from the state constitution of 1868, merely remarking that a law can be
infected with discriminatory intent at any stage.341 Despite the temporary
omission of felon disenfranchisement from the early drafts of the 1868
convention, it is reasonable to view its subsequent inclusion as a
continuation of the 1838 and 1865 laws.

334. 471 U.S. at 224-25 (1985).
335. Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
336. Id. at 391-92. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
337. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391.
338. Id.
339. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J.,
dissenting).
340. Id. at 1309.
341. Id. at 1294-95. Judge Kravitch, in dissent, stated that the court decided the wrong
issue: It was Florida’s constitution of 1968, not 1868, that was before the court. Id. at 1311
n.4. Moreover, she stated that the majority’s interpretation of the 1868 constitution is
flawed, though it can be assumed there was “some racial animus” present in 1868. Id. at
1310. She noted that Florida first denied felons the vote in 1838, which precludes any racial
intent as only white men had the franchise at that time. Id. at 1309. Florida’s first postCivil War Constitution in 1865 still denied blacks the vote and thus had to be replaced in
1868, but both also denied felons the vote. Id. Further, at least five black delegates at the
1868 convention supported the felon disenfranchisement provision. Id. She also pointed
out that the racist comments of a few delegates to the 1868 convention, to the effect that
they had been successful in their enterprise to deny suffrage to blacks, are not contextually
relevant to the specific provision in question. Id. at 1309 n.2.
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Even if discrimination was a motivating factor in 1868, however, Florida
reenacted its felon disenfranchisement law in its 1968 constitution. The
majority in Johnson characterized the re-enactment as a casual discussion
by a subcommittee of the convention, which was not enough to cleanse the
1868 constitution’s intentional discrimination; it is not an “independent,
non-discriminatory purpose.” 342 The operative principle was that the state
must break the “causal chain of discrimination.”343
But the reenactment of felon disenfranchisement in 1968 “conclusively
demonstrates” that the legislature would have enacted the same law absent
discriminatory motives. 344 The provision was actively and adequately
considered in committee. 345 The 1968 provision eliminated enumeration of
specific crimes resulting in disenfranchisement and instead broadly
excluded felons from suffrage. 346 This breaks any “causal chain of
discrimination” whereby “black” crimes were targeted and instead
indicates intent to disenfranchise all felons regardless of race, which is
consistent with the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.347
The majority claims the provision was inadequately considered in
committee.348 Applying this “consideration-in-committee” standard to
felon disenfranchisement as it was considered in 1868, would the court find
that if the consideration given to this issue was inadequate, then the statute
had never been infected with discriminatory intent as claimed?349
342. Id. at 1301.
343. Id. at 1298; see also Knight v. Ala., 14 F.3d 1534, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1994)
(reversing the district court’s ruling that current allocation of grants was not a vestige of
segregation, due to the absence of a break in the causal chain).
344. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1311 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 1314.
The 1968 Constitution’s felon disenfranchisement rule was first actively
considered by the Suffrage and Elections Committee. The record reflects that the
committee discussed the provision, debated proposed changes, and ultimately
decided to adopt the present provision, which is different from the 1868 provision.
The committee also considered an alternative motion that would have eliminated
the disenfranchisement rule to felons released from incarceration. After
discussion, the alternative motion failed. The new constitution was then accepted
by the full committee, approved by both legislative houses, and affirmed by a
state-wide referendum—all without any allegation of racial bias.
Id.
346. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1335.
347. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1308-11 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 92-94
and accompanying text.
348. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1301-02.
349. Id. at 1308 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
The plaintiffs’ expert states voter apportionment and the appointment (rather than
election) of many political posts were the most significant and well-known issues
of [the] 1868 Constitutional Convention, while felon disenfranchisement was a
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Regardless, the political machinations—absent discriminatory intent—
behind how this provision of the Florida state constitution was adopted are
not part of a proper analysis; the Supreme Court rejected a “political
exigency” argument in Richardson. 350
Not only the does Johnson examine the wrong law, it misapplies the
Hunter standard, which requires only that “legislators would have enacted
the felon disenfranchisement provision if they did not have an
impermissible motive.” 351 The Johnson majority uses a different standard
which would require a consideration of whether the constitutional
convention knew both of the prior discriminatory intent and effect and then
reenacted the provisions for different reasons. 352
The Supreme Court in Hunter found that judicial amendments did not
cleanse discriminatory laws of prior intent.353 In contrast, like the
Mississippi law in Fordice, the 1968 Florida provision at issue in Johnson
was the product of a constitutional convention and was subsequently
approved by both houses of the legislature and in a voter referendum; it is
not a mere statute or judicial decree. 354 Hunter is also distinguishable
because in that case the Alabama legislature acted quickly after the end of
de jure segregation to try to perpetuate it in another form. 355 Florida’s law,
however, was amended and reenacted a century after the provision may
There was no
have been infected with discriminatory intent. 356
discriminatory intent present in reenacting felon disenfranchisement in
Florida in 1968; none was even alleged by the plaintiff. 357

relatively minor issue. In fact, the plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that the
historical record is mixed on the felon disenfranchisement provision.
Id. at 1309 n.2.
350. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
Nor can we accept respondents’ argument that because [Section Two] was made
part of the Amendment “largely through the accident of political exigency rather
than through the relation which it bore to the other sections of the Amendment,”
we must not look to it for guidance in interpreting [Section One]. It is as much a
part of the Amendment as any of the other sections, and how it became a part of
the Amendment is less important than what it says and what it means.
Id.
351. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1311.
352. Id. at 1311-12.
353. Id. at 1312 n.6; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985).
354. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1314; see also Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.
1998); supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
355. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1313; see Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-30.
356. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1309.
357. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2002); see also Johnson,
353 F.3d at 1309.

Comment [C.E.L1]: I also found these sentences
confusing, and perhaps not needed for the larger
argument. The last sentence, if you want to keep it, I
think might benefit from unpacking to tie it into the
rest of the paragraph.
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C. Felon Disenfranchisement is a Policy Matter That Belongs in State
Legislatures
The right to vote is not unqualified.358 The establishment of specific
electoral qualifications for voters is delegated by the Constitution to the
states. 359 Courts have repeatedly upheld the power of the states to make
appropriate qualifications. 360 The real issue is whether disenfranchising
felons is an appropriate policy. That is a question that is better suited for
state legislatures than the courts. 361
1. Felon Disenfranchisement Serves Legitimate Policy Ends
A number of policy reasons have been advanced by proponents to justify
felon disenfranchisement. Some of these are vulnerable to legitimate
criticism. One frequently cited justification is that because felons have
already shown their willingness to break the law, allowing them to vote
would increase the likelihood of voter fraud.362 This is a weak justification
as there is little evidence to show that felons are more likely to engage in
voter fraud than anyone else. 363
Supporters also claim that the exclusion of felons from the voting booth
is necessary to prevent harmful changes to the law. 364 The Green court

358. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Additionally, children, the insane,
and aliens may not vote.
359. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Art. I, § 4
provides in relevant part, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
ch[oo]sing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The argument that Section Four provides a
way for Congress to circumvent the states’ powers to make voter qualifications given in
Section Two fails because Section Four only gives Congress authority to prescribe
conditions for “holding” elections, not for electors. See Clegg, H.R. 906 Statement, supra
note 322.
360. See e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“Th[e] ‘equal right to vote,’
is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate
access to the franchise in other ways.”) (internal citations omitted); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (“There can be no doubt either of the historic function of the States to
establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution, other
qualifications for the exercise of the franchise.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The Constitution does not in so many words confer a right to vote, though
it has been held to do so implicitly. Rather, it confers on the states broad authority to
regulate the conduct of elections, including federal ones.”) (internal citation omitted).
361. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974).
362. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1303.
363. Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 386.
364. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 10, at 1302-03.
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used the specter of “mafiosi” voting to justify the practice.365 While at first
glance this claim seems spurious, opponents of felon disenfranchisement
have pointed out how concentrated felons are in a handful of inner city
communities. 366 Especially when the issue is vote dilution, it is not
unimaginable that a large block of criminals in a district could swing an
election to a candidate who does not tout the “tough on crime” line.
Indeed, Democrats rely on the assumption that convicted felons will affect
election outcomes as they seek to enfranchise millions of sympathetic
voters. 367 Further, allowing millions of convicted felons into the voting
booths of a small number of predominately minority districts would
aggravate this impact and could conceivably infringe on the ability of lawabiding “members [of a protected class in those districts] . . . to elect
representatives of their choice,” 368 in contravention of the Voting Rights
Act. 369 The Supreme Court, moreover, has already made it clear that
legislatures cannot seek to “fence out” a group of voters based upon how
they might vote. 370
A third justification offered is the purity of the ballot box: “A State has
an interest in preserving the integrity of her electoral process by removing
from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior whose
behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s aims.” 371 Critics
respond by arguing that being convicted of a felony does not necessarily
diminish one’s “moral competence” and that in any event, the result is to
fence out groups of minority voters. 372 The Green court found that
denying felons the right to vote was reasonable, in light of the Lockean

365. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967).
366. Muntaqim’s vote dilution claim was partially based on the fact that eighty percent of
black and Hispanic inmates in New York State (who account for more than eighty percent
of all inmates) come from the New York City area. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102,
105 (2d Cir. 2004). In Baker, plaintiffs alleged that seventy-five percent of New York
State’s prison population came from fourteen assembly districts in New York City. Baker v.
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 923 (2d Cir. 1996).
367. Nearly seventy percent of disenfranchised felons may be Democrats. UGGEN &
MANZA, supra note 9, at 25. That enfranchised felons could decide the outcome of close
elections has been recognized since at least the Nineteenth Century. See Washington v.
State, 75 Ala. 582, 583 (1884).
368. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
369. See id; see also Clegg, supra note 14.
370. “‘Fencing out’ a sector of the population from the franchise because of the way they
may vote is constitutionally impermissible.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965)
(citations omitted).
371. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
372. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 390-91.
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conception of the social contract 373 as well as on more practical grounds
since,
it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators
who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors
who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to
consider their cases. This is especially so when account is taken of the
heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized crime. 374

As a policy justification, Locke’s social contract theory has withstood
the test of time; it served as a rationale for the enactment of felon
disenfranchisement laws in the past, 375 and remains a compelling argument
today. When someone commits a crime, he commits it not just against the
victim, but against our entire society. 376 Protests that time served is
enough, and that society should prioritize the rehabilitation and
reintegration of felons should fall on deaf ears.
Opponents of
disenfranchisement claim that the inability to vote stymies felons’
“remittance into a law-abiding society.” 377 Yet they neglect to explain why
the tonic of voting did not curtail felons from committing crimes initially.
Moreover, felon disenfranchisement is not the only collateral
consequence society has imposed on felons. Felons may be banned from
holding elective office.378 They may also be barred from holding certain
jobs, 379 serving on juries, 380 and receiving government benefits such as
welfare and food stamps in certain circumstances.381 Sex offenders have to
register with local authorities in some communities.382 Congress has also
enacted laws that bar felons from owning handguns.383 If qualifications

373. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
374. Id.
375. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261-62 (6th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes
21, 173 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
377. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 385.
378. See generally Andrea Steinacker, Note, The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws and the Right to Hold Public Office, 2003 BYU L. REV. 801.
379. “Ex-offenders are formally excluded from many employment opportunities that
require professional licenses. Such positions range from lawyer to bartender, from nurse to
barber, from plumber to beautician. . . . The Supreme Court has upheld the right of states to
establish qualifications for entry into certain employment.” Nora v. Demleitner, Preventing
Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 156 (1999).
380. Id. at 157.
381. Id. at 158.
382. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 657 (2005).
383. See United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2004).
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can be placed on a felon’s constitutional rights to free association and to
bear arms, voting should not be any different.384
Opponents claim that felon disenfranchisement is “anachronistic”385 and
They argue that “constitutional concepts of equal
“outmoded.” 386
protection are not immutably frozen like insects trapped in Devonian
amber,” 387 because “[n]otions of what constitutes equal treatment for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.” 388 Yet they attempt to
freeze felon disenfranchise laws in a particular time and place; namely, the
South, between Reconstruction and the Civil Rights movement. They do
not explain why centuries of prior non-discriminatory intent, nondiscriminatory laws enacted outside the South and recent, nondiscriminatory laws in liberal states like Massachusetts389 count for
nothing. It can be conceded that felon disenfranchisement was a
component of a few states’ systematic endeavor to subordinate AfricanAmericans, 390 but that does not mean these laws should be dispensed with
wholesale. After all, the Reconstruction Amendments themselves were
twisted to the same end: the Supreme Court used the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments in Plessy v. Ferguson to uphold the “separate but
equal” doctrine, 391 yet we have not dispensed with them. Moreover, none
of these laws is in place today and Richardson-Hunter already provides a
tool whereby purposefully discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws
can be eliminated. 392
Justifications for felon disenfranchisement and arguments against the
practice are policy arguments, which are the proper province of the
legislatures. 393 At least some of the angry commentators get one thing

384. The Constitution does not explicitly grant the right to vote; rather, it does so
“implicitly.” Hall v. Simcox, 766 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1985). The right of free association is
expressly provided for in the Constitution as “the right of the people peaceably to
assemble”. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The right to bear arms is also explicitly guaranteed by
the Second Amendment of the Constitution which provides “the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
385. Portugal, supra note 12, at 1338.
386. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974) (referring to the contentions of antidisenfranchisement amici).
387. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972); see generally Portugal,
supra note 12.
388. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
389. See Behrens, supra note 13, at 255 n.129.
390. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 83-98, 109-118 and accompanying text.
393. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55 (1974); see Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391,
396 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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right: The way to change felon disenfranchisement laws is to campaign in
state legislatures. 394 Such approaches have had some effect. For example,
in 2000, Connecticut restored voting rights to convicted felons on
probation, and Delaware amended its constitution so that it now reenfranchises felons five years after completion of their sentences, except
for those convicted of murders, sex offenses and certain other crimes. 395
Not all news is good news on that front, however, for opponents of the
practice—Kansas disenfranchised probationers in 2002, and Utah and even
Massachusetts both recently expanded their felon disenfranchisement laws
through voter approval of constitutional amendments. 396 If Florida’s felon
disenfranchisement law is struck down, it can be—and should be—
reenacted, just as Alabama’s law was after Hunter. 397 As the Richardson
court wisely noted more than thirty years ago:
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curia, are contentions
that these notions are outmoded, and that the more modern view is that it
is essential to the process of rehabilitating the exfelon [sic] that he be
returned to his role in society as a fully participating citizen when he has
completed the serving of his term. We would by no means discount these
arguments if addressed to the legislative forum which may properly weigh
and balance them against those advanced in support of California’s
present constitutional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of
values over the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they
advocate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably the
people of the State of California will ultimately come around to that view.
And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at least, of the
fact that there are two sides to the argument. 398

CONCLUSION
Felon disenfranchisement is plainly constitutional and consistent with
the intent of the framers of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act. It is a practice with deep roots in history that continues to be
widely utilized today.
It is fundamentally different than voter
qualifications used in the past to suppress black voting.
That African-Americans are disproportionately disenfranchised is a
394. See Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 397; One Person, No Vote, supra note 6, at
1957-59; Price, supra note 70, at 407-08.
395. See Price, supra note 70, at 401.
396. See Behrens, supra note 13, at 255 n.129.
397. Alabama currently disenfranchises felons in prison, parolees, probationers, and
certain ex-felons, although ex-felons can apply for reinstatement of voting rights. FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 178, at 2-3.
398. Richardson, 418 U.S at 55.
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matter of grave concern, but it is a side effect of high crime rates. It flows
from their status as felons, not from their race. “Felons [are not]
disenfranchised because of an immutable characteristic, such as race, but
rather because of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for
which they assume the risks of detention and punishment.” 399 If there is
discrimination in the criminal justice system, activists should attack that
phenomenon directly instead of focusing on a symptom. Their fixation
instead on disenfranchisement belies their political bias and motivation. 400
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement claim the practice is part of a
Republican strategy to suppress the predominately Democratic minority
vote. 401 Yet, clearly, opponents and their Democratic allies have
something to gain from the outcome of this issue as well. 402 That
recognition reinforces the notion that this is a political issue, and political
issues belong before qualified voters and their elected representatives.403

399. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986).
400. “[T]he number of Republican candidates that are being elected by only marginal
leads is . . . alarming.” Dugree-Pearson, supra note 7, at 374 (emphasis added).
401. See Chin, supra note 37, at 306-07. Contra Miles, supra note 183, at 122 (asserting
that felon disenfranchisement has no discernible impact on voter turnout, and thus has few
consequences for election results).
402. See generally UGGEN & MANZA, supra note 9.
403. Richardson, 418 U.S at 55.

